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Today’s dynamic food industry generates a highly 
competitive environment for food manufacturers 
and food retailers alike. Part of this ever-changing 
environment includes consolidation, new retail for-
mats, and globalization. Food manufacturers must 
also contend with power shifts in the channel that 
favor retailers and create pressure on manufactur-
ers to increase service while reducing costs. Food 
manufacturers therefore face a challenging prospect 
where service level, quality, and price expectations 
from retail customers and end consumers are high 
and continue to rise—while pressure exists to keep 
prices stable or even to reduce them. Purchasing, if 
managed effectively, offers opportunities for better 
cost control while improving service levels (Koca-
basoglu and Suresh 2006).
Many food manufacturers concentrate on devel-
oping effective procurement strategies in efforts 
to remain competitive. An effective purchasing 
strategy is “one that fits the needs of the business 
and strives for consistency between the firm’s in-
ternal capabilities and the competitive advantage 
being sought, as defined in the overall business 
strategy” (Monczka, Trent, and Handfield 1998, 
p. 183). Since an average manufacturer spends 
“55 cents out of every dollar of revenues on goods 
and services,” the impact of an effective procure-
ment strategy on company performance is easily 
observed (Monczka, Trent, and Handfield 1998, p. 
2). Furthermore, companies have increased the use 
of outsourcing considerably over the last decade, 
thereby increasing the need for procured materials 
and services (Leenders et al. 2006, p. 7). 
A food manufacturer typically procures two 
types of goods: commodity and non-commodity 
goods. Seitz (1994) defines commodity goods as 
“widely traded raw materials and agricultural 
products such as wheat, corn, and rice” (p. 435). 
Commodities must meet minimum quality stan-
dards to be classified in a certain grade or standard 
category of that commodity, e.g., #2 yellow corn 
(Seitz 1994). However, there is no differentiation 
between a commodity that just reaches the mini-
mum standard within a grade and a commodity 
that just misses the next higher grade. Conversely, 
non-commodity goods are highly differentiated, 
branded, and/or have value-added characteristics. 
For example, marinated chicken breasts may be 
differentiated by flavor and/or have added value 
provided by pre-cooking. 
While both commodity and non-commodity 
goods are important to manufacturers, the pro-
curement literature focuses on non-commodity 
procurement since its costs are relatively high for 
most manufacturing firms. Further, non-commod-
ity procurement is usually contract-based and can 
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modity procurement is considered to be more 
complex and thus has garnered more attention 
within procurement departments as well as in the 
academic literature. 
The literature on commodities has historically 
focused on selling or marketing commodities from 
a producer perspective. A key element of effective 
selling is an understanding of the customer (e.g., 
their wants/needs, important buying characteristics, 
the procurement process), yet literature on buyers’ 
perspectives on commodity procurement is notice-
ably scarce in both the general procurement and 
the commodity-marketing literature. This is perhaps 
due in part to the assumption in operational purchas-
ing models (e.g., Economic Order Quantity) that the 
price of material is “known and fixed” regardless 
of purchasing policy—however, when large price 
fluctuations occur for input materials (as can oc-
cur in commodity procurement), purchase price 
becomes more important and “must directly affect 
the purchasing policy” (Simon 2005). Commodity 
procurement, however, is an important consid-
eration. A recent study of mid-sized companies 
indicated that “a lack of sourcing and commodity 
skills” was rated as a top challenge, as companies 
often lacked expertise in key supply markets at a 
time when pressure to reduce cost is mounting and 
many commodity prices (e.g., oil) are increasing 
dramatically (Aberdeen Group, Inc. 2005). 
Commodity procurement has unique charac-
teristics that add complexity to the procurement 
function. In dealing with food commodities, buyers 
face not only the risk of inadequate supply but also 
the price risk inherent in seasonal and potentially 
volatile commodity markets. For example, seasonal-
ity and the need for buying products globally (e.g., 
coffee or cocoa) extends the lead time between 
when the purchasing commitment could be made 
and when the actual product is needed/used. This 
extended lead time increases price risk but also in-
creases the need for assurance of supply (Leenders 
et al. 2006, p. 214). Perishability and quality add 
risk components as well. Hayenga (1979) points out 
that the timing of commodity purchases can have a 
significant influence on unit costs for a firm. Com-
modity procurement therefore represents an area on 
which food manufacturers should focus in order to 
improve profit, service, and/or quality and to with-
stand pressures to reduce price. 
This research examines characteristics that im-
pact commodity-procurement strategy, develops 
a classification scheme for these characteristics, 
and evaluates the importance and impact that each 
characteristic has on commodity-procurement deci-
sions. Our findings lead to a proposed model of the 
strategic role of commodity procurement.
Commodity Procurement
The most basic function of a food manufacturer’s 
commodity-procurement department is to maintain 
commodity supply in order to meet production de-
mands. Managing supply risk is an essential element 
of this function and is critical to successful supply 
management (Zsidisin and Ellram 2003). The com-
modity-procurement department’s second function 
is cost minimization (Hayenga 1979). Commodity 
buyers accomplish these two functions by develop-
ing an optimal procurement strategy for each com-
modity depending on a variety of factors such as 
volume needs, associated risk, and potential costs. 
The commodity strategy “provides the specific de-
tails and outlines the actions to follow in managing 
the commodity for the long term” (Monczka, Trent, 
and Handfield 1998, p. 187). In this study, com-
modity-procurement strategy primarily describes 
food manufacturers’ choices regarding the timing 
and method of commodity purchases used to meet 
specific needs of the firms. It embodies the firm’s 
overall decision with respect to managing the com-
modity-procurement process. The two primary cat-
egories of commodity-procurement strategies are 
(1) spot-market (i.e., cash) transactions, and (2) 
forward purchasing mechanisms. Both categories 
are examined below.
Spot Market
The spot (cash) market is the traditional commodity-
procurement instrument, where buyers purchase the 
commodity in a predefined, general quality category 
on the cash market, immediately take possession, 
and have no direct contact with the supplier (Fer-
ris 1997). Spot markets “offer products at essen-
tially negligible lead time,” but this flexibility often 
comes at a higher price and incurs greater price un-
certainty (Seifert, Thonemann, and Hausman 2004). 
In food manufacturing, this strategy is employed as 
a simple replenishment strategy—e.g., when inven-
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a repurchase order is generated and carried out in 
the spot market. 
The spot market is widely used for several rea-
sons. First, as a procurement strategy, it does not 
involve sophisticated tactics or market analysis, 
but merely involves monitoring current supply and 
reordering (Arthur 1971). Spot-market purchases 
also minimize inventory costs, since no storage is 
needed if the purchase is tightly coordinated with 
production needs (Arthur 1971). Furthermore, 
the spot market is an applicable tool when there 
is little price movement, and hence little risk of 
price fluctuation, or when price movement cannot 
be predicted, limiting the ability to minimize price 
risk through other strategic means. 
While use of the spot market is often a viable 
commodity-procurement mechanism, exclusive use 
of the spot market does have disadvantages. There 
is the inherent risk that a manufacturer may not be 
able to procure the necessary volume when needed, 
leading to inefficiencies in manufacturing (Arthur 
1971). Furthermore, relying on only the spot market 
may eliminate opportunities to purchase commodi-
ties at lower prices, since the buyer is assumed to 
be a price-taker in the spot market. 
Forward Purchasing Mechanisms
Commodity-procurement instruments are some-
times used by firms to secure commodities needed 
for future production. These can be categorized as 
forward purchasing mechanisms, including forward 
buys and forward contracting. Each requires the 
buyer to project future quantity requirements. Firms 
also may reduce price risk by hedging spot-market 
purchases in the futures market. We do not discuss 
the use of futures markets in detail here since they 
are unavailable for the commodities considered in 
this research. 
Forward Buy
A forward buy is a natural extension of spot-market 
procurement. Manufacturers purchase and take pos-
session of a commodity in advance of manufactur-
ing needs when spot-market prices are favorable. 
As Hayenga (1979) discusses, manufacturers can 
then establish a per-unit commodity price, set final 
good prices and, hopefully, capture desired profit 
margins. It may be advantageous to establish per-
unit commodity cost on anticipated volume since 
“the timing of commodity purchases has a signifi-
cant influence on a firm’s costs” (Hayenga 1979, 
p. 351). For example, suppose a commodity price 
is forecasted to increase. If storage costs for that 
period are less than the forecasted price increase, a 
forward buy lowers per-unit commodity cost. How-
ever, price risk is inherent in a forward buy since 
the commodity price may not move as predicted 
after the forward purchase.
Variations exist on forward buys that affect who 
takes physical possession of the commodity at the 
time of purchase. This is a major consideration, 
especially if storage space is limited (Kingsman 
1985). If storage is limited, for example, it is advan-
tageous for the manufacturer to have the supplier 
retain possession until the manufacturer requests 
delivery.
Forward Contracts
A second forward purchasing mechanism used by 
manufacturers is a forward contract with a supplier 
that specifies delivery of a commodity at a certain 
future date (Ferris 1997). Such contracts typically 
stipulate all of the transaction’s details, including 
the quantity to be traded, the quality of the commod-
ity, delivery time and place, and price determination. 
Forward contracts offer the opportunity to procure 
commodities with the desired qualities for future 
processing without holding physical inventory 
and with little or no required payment in advance 
of delivery. A disadvantage of forward contracts 
is the possibility that the supplier fails to deliver 
either the desired quality or quantity. However, the 
likelihood of contract default is small and legal 
recourse is available.
Commodity-Procurement Characteristics
Given the lack of previous research in the procure-
ment literature specific to commodity-procure-
ment decisions and buying strategies, we relied on 
characteristics that were shown in the commodity-
marketing literature to affect marketing choices for 
commodities. The general proposition guiding this 
research is that characteristics which play a role 
in commodity-marketing decisions will also play 
a role in commodity-procurement decisions. The 
general procurement literature was also reviewed, 
and where characteristics relevant to commodity 
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included. A thorough review of the commodity-
marketing literature and the general procurement 
literature suggests that the following characteristics 
are important in commodity-procurement decisions: 
market efficiency, perishability, seasonality, storage 
requirements, commodity cost share, budget con-
straints, cooperative involvement, limited supply, 
price risk, storage availability, traceability, and 
volume. Additionally, insights provided by discus-
sions with commodity professionals and academics 
completed prior to the case interviews indicated 
that characteristics not previously discussed in the 
literature also affect procurement decisions, such 
as sales forecast accuracy, special promotions, 
and supplier service level. We discuss the nature 
of each characteristic below and provide examples 
from the literature.
The characteristics described above can be di-
vided into three broad categories which provide a 
potential framework for understanding and investi-
gating commodity-procurement decisions: product 
constraints, company constraints, and service con-
straints. Product constraints are those characteristics 
that derive either from the physical characteristics 
of the commodity itself or from the economics of 
the commodity’s market. Company constraints are 
those characteristics which are created by financial, 
managerial, or organizational characteristics of the 
firm. Service constraints are related to the manu-
facturer’s relationships with buyers of the finished 
good as well as with purchasers of the commodity. 
As one goal of this research is to better understand 
the nature of commodity-procurement decisions, 
adding a level of explanatory power by creating 
potential higher-order factors in these category 
classifications was important. Figure 1 illustrates 
the three commodity categories and the factors that 
affect decisions in each category. A discussion of 
the characteristics within each category follows, 
including the expected affect of each characteris-
tic on procurement strategy (e.g., spot market or 
forward pricing mechanism), assuming all other 
characteristics were held constant.
Product Constraints
Product constraints are related to the distinct charac-
teristics of the commodity that may require special 
attention. Some product constraints derive from 
physical characteristics of the commodity, while 
others are related to economic characteristics of the 
commodity’s market. Characteristics derived from 
product constraints include market efficiency, per-
ishability, seasonality, storage requirements, and 
the commodity cost share in the final product. Each 
characteristic is discussed briefly below.
 Market efficiency refers to the speed at which 
commodity markets react to and incorporate new in-
formation into market prices. Petzel (1997) indicated 
that “Market information is an important economic 
good that is valuable to the immediate participants 
in a trade and to others who operate in related areas. 
Good information guides efficient production and 
allocation decisions” (p. 256). A market with a high 
degree of market efficiency reacts very quickly to 
new information. Forward purchasing mechanisms 
are less likely to be implemented in more efficient 
markets, since a commodity-procurement depart-
ment would have limited ability to “beat” the market. 
In less efficient markets, a commodity-procurement 
department may hold an asymmetric information 
advantage and may execute a forward purchasing 
mechanism, such as a forward buy or a forward 
contract, before the market is able to react. An 
information “advantage” can occur through “ordi-
nary business activities” that enable a firm to better 
predict “input and output price movements more 
accurately than other market participants” (Knill, 
Minnick, and Nejadmalayeri 2006).
Perishability refers to the length of time before 
the commodity decays or spoils and can no longer 
be used in production. A high degree of perishability 
refers to a commodity with a relatively short shelf-
life before spoilage and thus a higher associated 
transaction cost. Since companies move away from 
open markets when transaction costs are high (Wil-
liamson 1975), it is unlikely a manufacturer will use 
the spot market for highly perishable commodities. 
High perishability also discourages a standard for-
ward buy that requires the buyer to secure storage. 
When commodities are highly perishable, it is 
likely that the manufacturer will develop forward 
contracts with a supplier to ensure fresh supply is 
delivered when needed to minimize risk. 
 Seasonality is the degree to which historic price 
swings (highs and lows) occur across growing sea-
sons. A high degree of seasonality implies a strong 
and predictable pattern for the commodity’s prices 
within a year. Seasonality in prices can stem from 
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in the Midwest) and seasonality in demand patterns 
(e.g., turkey sales increase around Thanksgiving). 
When purchasing highly seasonal commodities, it is 
likely that manufacturers will use forward purchas-
ing mechanisms, such as a forward buy, to obtain 
large volumes of commodities when prices are low 
and hold product in inventory (Kingsman 1985). 
Storage requirements of a commodity focus on 
the physical environment needed to preserve the 
commodity’s quality (e.g., refrigeration). High 
storage requirements imply higher storage costs, 
so commodities with high storage requirements are 
less likely to be purchased with forward purchas-
ing mechanisms, such as a forward buy (Kingsman 
1985). When a manufacturer cannot accommodate 
special storage requirements, taking possession of 
inventory in advance of production needs may not 
be practical. Furthermore, relatively higher storage 
costs may eliminate any financial gains generally 
available from a standard forward buy. Thus the 
tradeoff between reductions in unit price and in-
creases in storage costs must be considered, and is 
likely to favor a spot market strategy or a forward 
contract where delivery is taken close to the time 
of production.
 The commodity cost share in the final product 
is determined by the contribution of the commodity 
to overall final product cost. When commodity cost 
share is high, it is expected that manufacturers will 
use forward purchasing mechanisms to minimize 
price risk and ensure profit margins (Hayenga 1979). 
Forward purchasing mechanisms also allow a manu-
facturer to set a stable final product price, avoiding 
radical price fluctuations for the final good.
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Company Constraints
Company constraints are those characteristics that 
arise from the distinct characteristics or policies 
of the purchasing firm. Some company constraints 
stem from financial characteristics of the firm, 
while others are rooted in the firm’s managerial 
and organizational characteristics (e.g., policies, 
marketing strategies). The nature and size of mar-
kets in which the firm participates also play a role in 
creating company constraints. Budget constraints, 
cooperative involvement, limited supply, price risk, 
sales-forecast accuracy, storage availability, and 
volume are all company constraints.
 Budget constraints refer to the degree to 
which the budget for the commodity-procurement 
department is limited. In a strict budget environ-
ment, manufacturers are expected to be involved in 
fewer forward buys. Forward buys are expensive 
to execute in the short run since the manufacturer 
has to pay for the commodity before it is needed 
in production (Kingsman 1985). Furthermore, 
when budget constraints are high, it is expected 
that commodity-procurement departments focus 
more on cost avoidance or cost reduction. When 
budget constraints are more relaxed, the commod-
ity-procurement department can focus more on 
profit or revenue generation as measured against 
price risk. 
 Cooperative/common involvement refers to a 
situation where more than one entity is involved in 
the procurement decision. The most common form 
is a farmer cooperative–owned plant that buys com-
modities from its members. Common involvement 
can also occur when multiple manufacturers form 
a buying cooperative. Commodities procured under 
a common-involvement process are more likely to 
be purchased through a forward price mechanism. 
Nearly all of these cooperative involvements have 
some form of contract that commits the parties in-
volved to a given quantity of a commodity (Royer 
1995). In this sense, the manufacturer is committed 
to a future purchase, and thus will want to hedge 
price risk via forward purchasing mechanisms.
 When a limited supply exists at a specific qual-
ity level, it is more likely that forward purchasing 
mechanisms will be used. The primary benefit is the 
minimization of supply risk so that production can 
continue as planned and final product supply is not 
affected (Hayenga 1979).
 Price risk refers to volatility of the commodity 
price over time. Volatility is measured in percent-
age terms and annualized to evaluate the historical 
volatility of a commodity (Bittman 2001). Higher 
volatility implies higher price risk. If the commod-
ity price is relatively volatile, it is expected that a 
manufacturer will implement a risk-management 
instrument in the form of a forward purchasing 
mechanism, such as a forward buy. Without an ad-
vanced price mechanism there is a risk of paying 
a significantly higher price on the spot market. If 
there is little price risk, the spot market is generally 
sufficient. 
Nearly all manufacturers base their procurement 
volumes for input supplies, at least to some extent, 
on the sales-forecast accuracy of final product. 
Sales-forecast accuracy refers to the degree to which 
forecast sales mirror actual sales. It is expected that 
higher a degree of sales-forecast accuracy will lead 
to a higher likelihood of manufacturer use of forward 
purchasing mechanisms. Greater accuracy mini-
mizes volume risk, so a manufacturer can be more 
aggressive and focus on minimizing price risk. 
 Storage availability is the amount of physical 
space available for commodity storage. It is hy-
pothesized that manufacturers with relatively high 
storage availability are more likely to participate in 
forward buying activities since ample space is avail-
able for storing the procured commodity (Kingsman 
1985). Manufacturers with a relatively low amount 
of storage availability are limited to purchasing ac-
tivities that do not require taking possession of the 
commodity in advance of production, such as spot 
markets or forward contracts. 
 Volume is the amount of a commodity needed 
within a given time frame to fulfill manufacturing 
requirements. It is expected that a manufacturer 
would seek a forward purchasing mechanism for 
high-volume commodities to avoid the risk of stock 
outs. When manufacturers lack sufficient levels of 
high-volume commodities, it delays production 
and incurs significant cost (Kingsman 1985). For 
low-volume commodities, it is more likely that a 
manufacturer will buy the commodity on the spot 
market in order to save storage costs. 
Service Constraints
Service issues affect commodity-procurement de-
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the service that the manufacturers’ customers (e.g., 
generally retailers) demand; for this study, the cus-
tomer-service requirement examined is promotional 
expectations that a retailer may have as part of its 
marketing strategy for the manufacturer’s finished 
product. Second, service can equate to the require-
ments that the manufacturer sets for its suppliers, 
including supplier service level and traceability. 
The first service constraint affects the manufacturer 
as the seller of a finished good, while the second 
service standard affects the manufacturer as a buyer 
of a commodity product. Each of these constraints 
is discussed below.
 While most special promotions are based at the 
retail level, the end result is an increase in production 
quantities for the manufacturer—translating into an 
increase in the volume of the required commodity. 
Special promotions also put price pressure on com-
modity-procurement departments. If the final prod-
uct is discounted at retail, the base commodity must 
be purchased at a lower price in order to maintain 
profit margins. Based on pre-test interviews, it was 
apparent that this is a key characteristic, particularly 
in highly price-competitive markets. A special pro-
motion is expected to encourage a manufacturer to 
investigate forward purchasing mechanisms. Two 
reasons for more-advanced purchasing include the 
need to ensure sufficient supply exists to produce 
the desired amount of final product forecasted for 
the special promotion; and the need to protect profit 
margin needed to make the promotion worthwhile 
and successful for both the manufacturer and retail 
customer.
 Supplier service level refers to services avail-
able from a commodity provider, and can range 
from providing market forecasts to on-time de-
livery. Monczka and Trent (1995) list the service 
level of a supplier as one of the top five concerns 
of procurement. Commodities with a high service-
level requirement are more likely to be purchased 
through forward purchasing activities. A high ser-
vice level implies that a relationship generally exists 
between the two parties and more information is 
shared, allowing for forward purchasing activities 
to be executed (Kingsman 1985). It may indicate a 
higher level of trust and cooperation between the 
two parties. Thus manufacturers are more willing 
to listen to supplier ideas with respect to forward 
purchasing opportunities. Also, suppliers are more 
likely to work closely with manufacturers and assist 
in activities (e.g., cost-reduction programs) to en-
sure preferred-supplier status. Finally, since a spot 
market implies that no relationship exists between 
buyers and sellers, this procurement strategy will 
not be as beneficial when a high level of service is 
required.
 Traceability refers to the ability to trace the 
source of a commodity and other pertinent product 
information such as where and how the commod-
ity was grown (e.g., what herbicides were used on 
the field). A high degree of traceability refers to a 
commodity that can be completely traced back to its 
origins and where many details about the production 
environment of the commodity are known. When 
a high degree of traceability is required, a forward 
purchasing mechanism, such as a forward contract, 
is more likely to be used. While traceability is typi-
cally considered a differentiating trait, it is also true 
that the line between commodity and differentiated 
product becomes blurred when traceability is ap-
plied to commodity agriculture. In fact, it is the 
implementation of traceability that transforms an 
agricultural commodity into a differentiated prod-
uct. We include it here as an important characteristic 
that may guide how some food manufacturers make 
commodity-procurement choices. As traceability is 
integrated into a commodity or is expected from a 
supplier, the transaction costs of maintaining trace-
ability increase (Hobbs 1996), moving a manufac-
turer away from the spot market where commodities 
do not have traceability attributes. 
Methodology
Case-study methodology was used for this study. 
Case studies are appropriate when exploring “what” 
and “why” questions, and when the researcher has no 
control over the outcome (Yin 1989). As discussed 
by Sterns, Schweikhardt, and Peterson (1998), case-
study research is an increasingly important tool for 
agricultural economists. The general design for case 
studies includes the following five components: the 
unit of analysis, the research questions, the research 
propositions, the logical process for linking the data 
to the propositions, and the criteria for interpreting 
the findings (Yin 1989). For this research, the unit 
of analysis is food manufacturers and their choices 
with respect to procurement strategy. Since very 
little attention has been given in the literature to 
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ment strategies, case study is an appropriate meth-
odology, because the “what” and “why” questions 
are particularly insightful and may lead to further 
research streams. 
A thorough literature review identified typi-
cal characteristics that affect commodities. An 
open-ended discussion-based questionnaire was 
developed to better understand “what” commod-
ity-procurement characteristics are important to 
buyers and “why” those characteristics affect 
commodity-procurement decisions. As is standard 
in any questionnaire development, we pre-tested 
the case questionnaire with several academics and 
industry representatives familiar with commod-
ity marketing and commodity procurement in the 
food industry. The pre-test phase resulted in the 
addition of several characteristics which affect 
commodity procurement and have not previously 
been discussed in the literature. The discussion of 
these additional characteristics was included in the 
previous section. The questionnaire is provided in 
the Appendix.
The research propositions were exploratory 
which, as explained by Yin (1989), focus mainly 
on the purpose of the study. As such, the research 
propositions were focused on discovering whether 
or not individual commodity characteristics were 
important in a procurement decision, whether the 
decision followed expected patterns as shown in 
previous literature (e.g., in a more efficient market, 
are forward purchasing mechanisms less likely to 
be implemented), and whether decision patterns are 
consistent across the buyers interviewed.
The logical process for linking the data to the 
propositions and the criteria for interpreting the 
findings were completed following pattern-match-
ing logic. As stated by Yin (1989), pattern-matching 
logic compares the patterns discovered through the 
interview process to the predicted patterns. Through-
out the research, pattern matching was performed 
and included cross-case pattern analysis.
Participant Descriptions
The participating companies are all involved in 
food manufacturing, yet they each occupy a dif-
ferent strategic position. All three companies are 
medium- to large-scale food manufacturers that 
use both spot market and forward purchasing 
mechanisms across different food and agricultural 
commodities. One company manufactures and 
markets its own national brand in a niche market 
that includes both mainline and organic products. 
Another company primarily processes and packages 
for a top-selling national brand in its category. The 
third company is a leading broad-line foodservice 
distributor that manufactures and markets its own 
branded products and/or outsources production of 
its branded products to contract manufacturers. 
Specific company information is not disclosed here 
due to confidentiality agreements; however, each 
company is a leader in its segment and procures 
a broad range of food commodities. Additionally, 
there is overlap among companies in the types of 
food commodities procured, which increases the 
richness of the case-study results. 
The three food manufacturers have similarly or-
ganized commodity-procurement departments. The 
basic structure consisted of one overall director of 
commodity procurement, with specific commodity-
group responsibilities assigned to buyers reporting 
to that director. In one company, a business-sup-
port individual assisted each buyer. All participat-
ing companies assigned buyer responsibilities by 
related commodities. For example, one buyer would 
have responsibility for all dairy commodities. Or-
ganizing responsibilities in this way allows buyers 
to specialize in one commodity group and enables 
food manufacturers to benefit from the buyer’s ex-
pertise. The firms employed between three and 12 
buyers. In general, individual buyers had authority 
to make final decisions on commodity-procurement 
strategy. 
Twelve commodity-procurement personnel 
across the three food manufacturers were inter-
viewed, including agricultural-commodity buyers 
and managers in each firm’s procurement depart-
ment. Table 1 reports the number of interviews at 
each company as well as the positions held by the 
participants. Interviews were conducted on-site at 
the firms’ facilities with two companies, requiring 
approximately one day on site. A third company was 
interviewed over the telephone. Individual inter-
viewees were asked to answer the entire question-
naire. As such, a multi-case design was employed 
and replication logic procedures were followed 
whereby each case either provided support for 
similar results or logically explained dissimilar re-
sults. This number of interviews is higher than the 
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(1988) and highlights the ability for this exploratory 
study to provide insights into commodity-purchas-
ing strategies. The breadth of companies and the 
diversity of the commodities involved in the study 
increases the likelihood of generalizability outside 
of this particular sample. 
Research Results
Study respondents shared information on company 
structure, perceived roles of commodity-procure-
ment departments, the commodity-procurement 
characteristics, and the choice of commodity-pro-
curement strategy. Their responses are summarized 
below.
Procurement Characteristics and Strategy
Table 2 summarizes the number of buyers assigning 
importance to individual commodity characteris-
tics in the procurement decision (holding other 
characteristics constant), the expected procure-
ment strategy, and the consistency of respondents’ 
procurement strategies with the expected strategy. 
The importance of individual characteristics to in-
dividual buyers or managers varies, likely due to 
the nature and diversity of commodities included in 
the study. Many participant responses confirm the 
expected relationships with some variation across 
participants. Results for each group of constraints 
are discussed below.
Product Constraints
Buyer responses were mixed as to which product-
constraint characteristics they considered when 
choosing a commodity-procurement strategy. 
Perishability and seasonality were considered 
by all twelve of the participants, while ten of the 
twelve considered market efficiency in their deci-
sions. Buyers indicated a greater profit opportunity 
exists in relatively inefficient markets. Storage re-
quirements and commodity cost share were con-
siderations for only a few of the buyers (three and 
two, respectively). Storage requirements were only 
considered by buyers who were procuring frozen or 
refrigerated goods where storage space is relatively 
limited and expensive. Other buyers indicated that 
storage considerations did not enter the strategy de-
cision since storage space is generally available and 
inexpensive (though the authors argue that buyers 
Table 1. Job Responsibilities for Survey Participants.
Personnel position Commodity
Company 1 Head of procurement Wide range of fruits and vegetables; 
popcorn
Company 2 Procurement director
Packaging procurement director
Buyer Fruits & Vegetables
Assistant buyer Fruits & Vegetables
Buyer Meats, Grains, & Oils
Assistant buyer Meats. Grains, & Oils
Company 3 Commodity-procurement director
Lead buyer of soft commodities Wheat, flour, soybean oil, orange juice, 
coffee
Dairy buyer Eggs, cheese, butter, milk, also some 
fruit and vegetable
Meat buyer Beef and pork
Meat buyer Chicken, poultry, and seafoodJournal of Food Distribution Research 38(3) 46   November 2007 Jones et al. Commodity-Procurement Strategies of Food Companies: A Case Study   47
are implicitly considering storage but that it is not a 
binding constraint in these cases). Most buyers paid 
little attention to commodity cost share, indicating 
that their primary focus was procuring the appropri-
ate volume at the lowest possible cost. 
When buyers considered a product constraint 
as important in choosing a procurement strategy, 
they were also in full agreement with the expected 
strategic choice. The buyers, indicating that market 
efficiency and storage requirements were impor-
tant considerations, also indicated that the optimal 
procurement strategy given high levels of these 
characteristics would be the spot market. In the 
case of market efficiency, buyers believe they hold 
an asymmetric information advantage over other 
players in inefficient markets, likely attributable 
to expertise gained from frequent participation 
in the market, as described by Carlton and Perloff 
(1989). This expertise facilitated more opportunities 
to optimally time purchases through forward buys 
or forward contracts. Greater market efficiency 
dissipates the asymmetric information advantage, 
leading to spot-market procurement. 
For the buyers who considered storage require-
ments as important (recall these were primarily 
buyers of frozen commodities), the spot market 
was generally used to avoid the search costs of 
finding additional storage and the high cost of 
leased storage. Regarding perishability, seasonal-
ity, and commodity cost share, buyers agreed that 
high levels of these characteristics would result 
in some type of forward purchasing mechanism 
rather than spot-market usage. When commodities 
are highly perishable, buyers prefer to implement 
Table 2. Procurement Characteristics: Rate of Consideration and Agreement with Hypothesis.
Procurement characteristic







Market efficiency 10  Spot market 10
Perishability 12  Forward purchasing  12
Seasonality 12  Forward purchasing 12
Storage requirements 3  Spot market 3
Commodity cost share 2  Forward purchasing  2
Company constraints
Budget constraints 5  Spot market 5
Cooperative/common involvement 1  Forward purchasing 1
Limited supply of specified quality 3  Forward purchasing 3
Price risk 12  Forward purchasing 10
Sales-forecast accuracy 12  Forward purchasing 12
Storage availability 0  Forward purchasing 0
Volume 7  Forward purchasing 7
Service constraints
Special promotions 9  Forward purchasing 9
Supplier service level 12  Forward purchasing 0
Traceability 3  Forward purchasing 3
*Expected procurement strategy assuming the level of characteristic is high (e.g., if market efficiency is high, the spot market is 
the expected strategy). 
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forward contracts with specific delivery times to 
avoid as much storage as possible. Alternatively, 
some buyers pursue forward buys for perishable 
commodities, but with much shorter time horizons 
than for non-perishable commodities. All buyers 
were concerned about over-purchasing for actual 
production needs, given the perishable nature of 
the commodity. 
Buyers agreed that a high degree of seasonality 
would lead to procurement with forward purchas-
ing mechanisms. Seasonality can affect both com-
modity availability and price risk for commodity 
buyers. Buyers serve the supply-assurance func-
tion by forward contracting or making forward 
buys to ensure that adequate volumes are available 
for future production. Buyers minimize price risk 
by timing purchases to take advantage of seasonal 
price swings. 
Company Constraints
In general, buyers gave less weight to company 
constraints than to characteristics in the product 
constraint and service constraints categories. Only 
price risk and sales-forecast accuracy were consid-
erations for all 12 of the buyers in the study. Volume 
was a consideration by seven of the 12, while budget 
constraints, cooperative/common involvement, and 
limited supply of a specific quality were consider-
ations of less than half of the buyers (five, one, and 
three, respectively). Buyers were more concerned 
with obtaining an adequate return, so budget con-
straint was not an issue. The primary reason given 
for the lack of cooperative consideration was high 
transaction costs, including high coordination cost, 
high cost of developing common buying plans, and 
philosophical differences regarding how the com-
modity should be procured. In essence, the transac-
tion costs were too high to make cooperative buy-
ing a profitable option for the participants in this 
study. Most buyers indicated that limited supply of 
a specified quality did not have a significant impact 
because they were buying commodities that meet 
basic standards. None of the 12 buyers explicitly 
considered storage availability as important to the 
procurement-strategy decision. However, as with 
storage requirements, it does seem that buyers are 
implicitly considering storage availability, as their 
general assessment was that storage space was 
available, whether owned or rented, if needed.
Buyers who considered company constraints 
in procurement-strategy choice also chose pro-
curement strategies consistent with the proposed 
choice with the exception of the price-risk charac-
teristic. The majority of participants (ten of 12) in 
the study agreed with the expectation that a high 
degree of price volatility would encourage a for-
ward purchasing strategy assuming other factors, 
such as perishability, are not contradictory. Those 
disagreeing viewed price risk as a distraction to 
forward buying for fear of improperly timed buys 
(e.g., when prices may be higher). These buyers 
believed that using the cash market was the best 
way to minimize risk. 
The three buyers who considered limited supply 
of a given quality to be important felt that obtaining 
the desired quality level gave their firm a competi-
tive advantage for the final product. They agreed 
that forward purchasing mechanisms were the 
best way to ensure that adequate quantities of that 
quality were available. Buyers agreed that budget 
constraints would encourage spot-market procure-
ment to postpone the purchase as long as possible, 
conserve cash flow, and reduce the chance of over-
purchasing. Buyers also indicated that accurate 
sales forecasts allow them to be more aggressive 
with buying strategies and that forward purchasing 
strategies are more likely when sales forecasts are 
regarded as more accurate. Accurate sales forecasts 
also help buyers better time purchases since the 
quantity needed for each period is known. 
For the seven buyers who considered volume as 
an important determinant of procurement strategy, 
it was clear that higher volume encourages forward 
buys. Generally, these buyers found high-volume 
commodities were usually core ingredients for fi-
nal products, so the goal became maintaining sup-
ply. Several respondents indicated that they first 
concentrated on larger-volume commodities since 
these commodities potentially have the highest 
impact on profitability. In cases where profit was 
the strategic role of the commodity-procurement 
department, buyers were more likely to develop a 
unique buying strategy for large-volume purchases. 
The five buyers who did not consider volume to be 
important viewed all commodity purchases as profit 
opportunities and were focused on return on invest-
ment. These buyers also noted that commodity value 
was more important than commodity volume alone. 
When value was high, these buyers were more likely 
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Service Constraints
Service constraints include special promotions, 
supplier service level, and traceability. Each of the 
nine buyers indicating that special promotions play 
a role in their commodity-procurement strategy also 
said that special promotions would lead to using 
forward purchasing mechanisms. Knowledge of the 
special promotion with sufficient advance notice al-
lows the buyer to take advantage of more innovative 
strategies, and to use accurate sales forecasts and 
projected margins. Generally, buyers who consid-
ered special promotions in their procurement strat-
egy were more likely to use a forward purchasing 
mechanism, avoiding the risk of spot-price increases 
between the promotion proposal and the promotion 
implementation. 
A major finding of this research is that while 
all 12 buyers agree that supplier service level is an 
important consideration in choosing a procurement 
strategy, none agreed with the hypothesis that higher 
supplier service levels would encourage the use of 
forward purchasing mechanisms. Instead, they 
viewed adequate supplier service level as a basic 
prerequisite to a business relationship with their 
firm. Services expected by buyers included supply 
maintenance, on-time delivery, market knowledge, 
buyer-firm familiarity, exhibiting cooperation, and 
offering market opinions. Buyers will not procure 
products from suppliers that do not provide ad-
equate service levels (as defined by the individual 
buyers and/or company). 
Only three of the 12 buyers considered trace-
ability, but those three buyers indicated that trace-
ability was a very important characteristic. These 
firms market traceability in their final product and 
use forward contracts to ensure that the commod-
ity meets traceability specifications. As such, trace-
ability is a key role in the strategic direction of this 
commodity-procurement department and plays a 
role in this firm’s service requirements.
Additional Insights from Case Studies
Further insights were gathered beyond the study’s 
initial objectives, which is not uncommon in case-
study research. Two primary insights relate to the 
roles of commodity-procurement departments. 
Buyers recognized that the commodity-procure-
ment department’s role often strongly affected the 
procurement strategy selected. For example, when 
a company used traceability as a marketing tool 
for their finished product, traceability became, in 
part, the responsibility of the commodity-procure-
ment department and led to a different procurement 
choice (a forward contract) that would ensure sup-
ply traceability. 
 The second primary insight is that the role of 
the commodity-procurement department can vary 
and may follow an evolutionary process. This is 
demonstrated in part by the fact that there was little 
consistency across buyers regarding the commodity-
procurement department’s strategic role. Perceived 
strategic objectives included controlling supply to 
the production plant, minimizing inventory, finding 
new suppliers, assisting the marketing department, 
improving/maintaining quality standards, assuring 
traceability, reducing cost, serving as a profit center, 
providing service or value to customers (e.g., retail-
ers), minimizing risk, and taking advantage of op-
portunities in volatile markets. At first glance it may 
be troublesome that such wide arrays of objectives 
are perceived by buyers in these three companies’ 
commodity-procurement departments. However, 
these various strategic roles can be organized into 
three main categories: supply-maintenance–fo-
cused, profit-focused, or relationship-focused. 
Supply-maintenance–focused commodity-pro-
curement departments are primarily concerned with 
maintaining supply to the production facility. Profit-
focused commodity-procurement departments 
seek potential profit opportunities in the market by 
making well-timed purchases. Relationship-focused 
commodity-procurement departments concentrate 
on providing value to their customers (generally 
to retailers) which also may be accomplished, in 
part, by forming close-knit relationships with key 
suppliers. 
Further discussion with these commodity-pro-
curement professionals suggests an evolutionary 
path with respect to the strategic role of a company’s 
commodity-procurement department. This sequen-
tial path is visually presented in Figure 2. The wide 
arrays of responses above suggest that buyers are 
at different stages in the evolutionary process with 
respect to the commodities that they procure. 
Given this evidence, we propose that a commod-
ity-procurement department has three strategic lev-
els: supply-maintenance–focused, profit-focused, 
and relationship-focused. Furthermore, each level 
is associated with a corresponding commodity-
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company constraints, and service requirements, 
respectively). A firm must first reach a minimum 
standard at the lowest level of the triangle before it 
proceeds to higher levels. For example, buyer and 
management responses to this study indicate that 
the chief objective of any commodity-procurement 
department must be to secure adequate supply, and 
that only when this minimum standard is met can 
buyers begin to focus on increasing profit. When 
a firm’s commodity-procurement department 
becomes proficient at increasing profit (through 
various “sub”-strategies), buyers can then focus 
on relationship-building. It is important to note 
that attainment of the next level in the strategic 
role triangle does not negate the importance of the 
prior level, but instead builds on competency at the 
prior level. In fact, competency levels may continue 
to increase at previous levels as new competencies 
are built at the next level, presuming that the firm’s 
minimum standard at the previous level has already 
been attained. That is, the strategic levels should be 
considered as building blocks rather than stepping 
stones. It also implies that a commodity-procure-
ment department provides increased value to the 
competitive nature of the firm as its role move up 
the triangle. Each level of the strategic role triangle 
is discussed in depth below. 
The research showed that ensuring sufficient 
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volume to fulfill manufacturing demands was of-
ten the buyer’s first concern. In order to maintain 
supply, the commodity-procurement department 
must reduce the risk of stocking out. In this sense, 
characteristics considered under product constraints 
may more prominently drive procurement deci-
sions. There are many ways to manage this task, and 
commodity-procurement personnel will continue to 
find more innovative and cost-saving ways of pro-
tecting supply. A popular means of obtaining this 
goal is to have contracts to ensure supply. In some 
cases, the contract price is set when the contract is 
signed. Others included some type of formula that 
tied the contract price to the market price of that 
commodity at the time of delivery. The formula 
contracts allow commodity buyers to ensure their 
supply while also developing buying strategies that 
can be profitable. 
When commodity-procurement departments are 
more profit-focused, they must focus beyond just 
eliminating or protecting against supply shortages. 
Commodities, by their nature, do not generally fol-
low stable prices, resulting in inherent price risk. 
A commodity buyer must design a plan to increase 
profitability without increasing supply risk. Buy-
ers must evaluate the risk-reward tradeoff and 
determine how much price risk they are willing to 
take in order to achieve expected profits. In most 
cases, it is nearly impossible to consistently buy 
a commodity at the lowest market price, and also 
to consistently avoid buying when the market is 
at its highest. If the strategic role of commodity-
procurement department is to be a profit center, 
buyers are more likely to take additional price risk 
to try to maximize profit opportunities in the mar-
ket. As such, buyers may begin to focus more on 
characteristics associated with company constraints 
in an effort to manage/calculate risk. Alternatively, 
if the commodity-procurement department is more 
risk-averse, buyers are less likely to seek maximum 
returns on a commodity purchase and more likely 
to stay at the supply-focused level.
The relationship-focused strategy is potentially 
the most advanced strategic level. Under this strat-
egy, food manufacturers seek to develop closer 
relationships with their customers and suppliers 
in order to ensure the commodity-procurement 
department is integral to the cross-functional team 
working on the customer account. In order to 
implement additional services to customers, com-
modity-procurement departments must first be ef-
ficient in maintaining supply and being profitable. If 
a commodity-procurement department cannot fulfill 
these first strategic roles, then is it unlikely they 
can successfully provide value-added services for 
their customers. This requires commodity buyers to 
focus on characteristics associated with service con-
straints. An example demonstrated in this research 
is food manufacturers working with retail customers 
on special promotions. Food-manufacturer repre-
sentatives, including a commodity-procurement 
buyer, help the retailer design and implement the 
promotion. The role of the commodity-procurement 
representative is to ensure that the increased quan-
tity demanded is attainable at a price that allows the 
promotion to be profitable.
Conclusions
This research uses an exploratory case-study ap-
proach to empirically evaluate the influence of vari-
ous characteristics (classified as product constraints, 
company constraints, and service constraints) on 
commodity-procurement decisions. Characteristics 
evaluated in the study include those described in 
previous literature and new characteristics garnered 
from interviews with commodity professionals. 
Second, the study empirically evaluates those 
characteristics as to their importance in selected 
firms’ commodity-procurement departments. Some 
of the factors that the literature suggested are impor-
tant in commodity marketing and/or procurement 
decisions were very important empirically across 
all participants. Other factors that the literature 
indicated are important in commodity marketing 
and/or procurement decisions varied greatly across 
this study (e.g., storage costs).
This research also provides a framework for clas-
sifying commodity-procurement strategies as well 
as insight into a potential model for examining the 
evolving role that commodity-procurement depart-
ments can play within corporate strategy (Figure 2). 
The classification framework would illustrate that 
commodity-procurement decisions occur across 
three categories: product constraints, company 
constraints, and service constraints (as shown in 
Figure 1). The potential model for examining the 
role of commodity procurement within corporate 
strategy (as shown in Figure 2) implies that a com-
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supply maintenance. Once a commodity-procure-
ment department has mastered maintaining supply, 
it can progress toward more profit–focused strate-
gies. The final evolution moves toward development 
of a relationship-focused strategy. This model may 
allow managers to determine the strategic role of 
commodity-procurement departments, help the 
commodity-procurement department prioritize 
which characteristics to focus on, and consider 
how a commodity-procurement department can 
add additional value to the company. 
Research Limitations and Future Directions
Qualitative research has its place in conducting 
problem-solving research and developing new 
theory (Sterns, Schweikhardt, and Peterson 1998), 
but certainly further quantitative research methods 
are important. This research is a first step of trying 
to understand the “what” and “why” of commod-
ity procurement since so little information exists 
regarding this activity. However, further research 
needs to be conducted.
Replication of the research using a larger sample 
size would provide additional insights on commod-
ity procurement for food manufacturers. In addition, 
this study did not evaluate different-sized commod-
ity groups and different dollar values across com-
modities. Examining food manufacturer’s procure-
ment decisions relative to the amount spent on each 
buy would provide “rules of thumb” concerning 
the risk-return trade-off that must be evaluated and 
could provide answers regarding when it is worth 
developing an advanced buying strategy. 
Perhaps the most intriguing future research 
direction is to further develop the commodity-pro-
curement decision framework in order to test for a 
higher order factor across product constraints, com-
pany constraints, and service constraints. Further 
research could also examine and test the existence 
of an evolutionary commodity-procurement strat-
egy and its role in corporate strategy. Additionally, 
the relationship between the procurement decision 
framework and the strategic value of commodity 
procurement (e.g., would product-constraint–ori-
ented decisions more likely be used in a supply-
maintenance–focused strategy, while perhaps ser-
vice-constraint–oriented decisions may more likely 
be used in a relationship-focused strategy?) would 
offer an additional research area.
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1. Could you please provide me with some back-
ground on your company’s procurement struc-
ture and its relationship to overall company 
structure?
2. Describe how your commodity procurement 
group is organized and how buying responsi-
bilities are assigned.
3. What strategic role does commodity procure-
ment play with your company?
4. Is the trend within your company to have more 
or less commodity buyers? Why?
5. Are the buyers organized by specific commod-
ity groups or more decentralized across various 
commodities?
6. What are the different commodity buying strate-
gies that you use?
7. Who decides what commodity buying strategy 
is used?
8. What determines what commodity buying strat-
egy is used? Why?
9. How have these commodity strategies changed 
in the last 5 years? Why?
10. What advantages/disadvantages have you seen 
with these changes?
11. How do you see commodity buying strategies 
changing in the next 5 years? Why?
12. What do you see as the potential advantages/
disadvantages of these future changes?
13. What materials are you using to train employees 
on different buying strategies?
14. How is price risk involved in a procurement 
decision? 
15. If price risk is high what type of strategy does 
this generally lead to?
16. How is volume of commodity purchased in-
volved in a procurement decision?
17. If volume of commodity purchased is high what 
type of strategy does this generally lead to?
18. How is commodity perishabilty involved in a 
procurement decision?
19. If perishabilty is high what type of strategy does 
this generally lead to?
20. How is the accuracy of sales forecast involved 
in a procurement decision?
21. If there is a high degree of accuracy of sales 
forecast what type of strategy does this generally 
lead to?
22. How do special promotions become involved 
in a procurement decision?
23. If there is a large special promotion ahead what Journal of Food Distribution Research 38(3) 52   November 2007 Jones et al. Commodity-Procurement Strategies of Food Companies: A Case Study   53
type of strategy does this generally lead to?
24. How does the amount of space required for stor-
age of a commodity involved in a procurement 
decision? 
25. If the storage requirements are high what type 
of strategy does this generally lead to?
26. How does the amount of space available for 
storage of a commodity involved in a procure-
ment decision? 
27. If the storage availability is high what type of 
strategy does this generally lead to?
28. How does the cost storage of a commodity 
involved in a procurement decision?
29. If the storage costs are high what type of strat-
egy does this generally lead to?
30. How does the efficiency of the market of a com-
modity involved in a procurement decision? 
31. If the price discovery mechanism for a com-
modity is highly developed what type of strategy 
does this generally lead to?
32. How is a budget constraint involved in a pro-
curement decision? 
33. If there is a tight budget constraint what type 
of strategy does this generally lead to?
34. How does seasonality of a commodity involved 
in a procurement decision? 
35. If the seasonality is high what type of strategy 
does this generally lead to?
36. How does traceability of a commodity involved 
in a procurement decision? 
37. If the traceability is high what type of strategy 
does this generally lead to?
38. How is cooperative involvement involved in a 
procurement decision? 
39. If the cooperative involvement is high what 
type of strategy does this generally lead to?
40. How does the value of the commodity in the 
final good involved in a procurement decision? 
41. If the value of the commodity is high in the final 
product what type of strategy does this generally 
lead to?
42. How is the service level of the commodity sup-
plier involved in a procurement decision? 
43. What types of services do you expect from your 
suppliers? 
44. If the service level from the supplier is high 
what type of strategy does this generally lead 
to?
45. How are quality specifications of a commodity 
involved in a procurement decision?
46. If there is a very limited supply of specific qual-
ity of a commodity what type of strategy does 
this generally lead to?
47. Are there any other major factors that you 
consider when making commodity procurement 
decisions?